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national politics? How are riots, rebellions and revolutions enacted? And so 
on. In this way, we can take the asymmetries of power and participatory 
processes as a historical problem to be connected to the two macro-pro-
cesses represented by the development of states (and the systems of States) 
and the expansion of the capitalist system of production. As Tilly points out 
(1981, 46), state and capitalism provide the framework for a historically 
rooted analysis of collective action and of the ways by which individuals 
act together in pursuit of shared interests. «Instead of the eternal behavior 
of crowds, we study the particular forms of action that people use to ad-
vance claims or register grievances. Instead of laws of social movements, 
we study the emergence of the social movement as a political phenomenon. 
Instead of power in general, we study the modalities of power within a cer-
tain mode of production» (ibid.). In particular, the two macro-processes in-
fluence the direction of change by acting on three fundamental components 
of collective action: the “interests” for which individuals decide to act col-
lectively, their “capacity” to act in defense of those interests, and the “op-
portunity” to advance or defend those interests through the development of 
coordinated collective action. 
 
 
4. Historical comparison as a sociological instrument 
Antonio Gramsci’s historical sociology cannot disregard the use of compar-
ison as a privileged instrument of knowledge. As above mentioned, he is 
interested in understanding the reason why, in Italy, a revolution on the So-
viet or Jacobin model is impossible. His interpretation, the result of a care-
ful comparative analysis, can be ascribed to the role of intellectuals and to 
the structure of civil society. 
Gramsci distinguishes between organic and traditional intellectuals. The 
first are those whose origins coincide with those of the social group they 
wish to represent. They are defined according to the functions conferred on 
them by the social group from which they originate in economic and politi-
cal, as well as cultural and ideological spheres. Organic intellectuals repre-
sent a function of the interests of a class, but also an instrument of social 
transformation. Traditional intellectuals, on the other hand, seem to be the 
expression of an uninterrupted historical continuity. Their raison d'être is 
based on the autonomy of their past and on the need to reproduce their 
caste-like position in contemporary society. What really defines traditional 
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intellectuals is the dialectically negative response to new social groups. 
Their autonomy is in direct opposition to the progressive aspirations of 
emerging social forces. At this point, for Gramsci, the central issue beco-
mes a comparative analysis of intellectual blocs within concrete historical 
blocs, as were those emerged in European societies. In particular, his focus 
is on the bourgeois hegemonic capacity in France, Italy, England and Ger-
many. 
In France, the central element of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the 
landed aristocracy is represented by the contrast in terms of superstructure 
between bourgeois organic intellectuals and the Church. In that context, a 
progressive bourgeoisie was able to erode the feudal economic and institu-
tional structures, giving rise to a capitalist mode of production. Such a 
structural process would not have happened if it had not been accompanied 
by an ideological movement opposing those traditional intellectuals who 
had found in the ecclesiastical institutions their strongest allies. The tactics 
of the bourgeoisie were meant to get rid of traditional intellectuals and, at 
the same time, to assimilate them. In this way, the French bourgeoisie were 
able to build a new historical bloc impermeable to repeated attempts at res-
toration. 
In Italy, instead, the bourgeoisie began to form around the eighteenth cen-
tury, that is the era of medieval municipalities and city-states. Although 
they tried on various occasions to displace the political domination of the 
aristocracy, they were never able to transcend their corporate stage to beco-
me the hegemonic social group. The bourgeoisie  failed in the attempt to 
create their own organic intellectuals capable of addressing the power of 
the Church as well as traditional intellectuals. The failure of the Italian 
bourgeoisie led to the formation of small states ruled by the old aristocracy, 
thus blocking for several years the process of modernization. The same 
process of the Italian Risorgimento, which would take place almost a cen-
tury after the French Revolution, would be led by moderates able to exert a 
strong power of attraction also towards democratic intellectuals close to the 
Action Party. The Italian middle class has always remained an elite and 
therefore it has never sought the consent of the masses which, according to 
Gramsci, constitute the only possibility to ensure a real process of social 
transformation. 
In England, middle class patterns of development differs from the French 
and the Italian cases. Here the bourgeois revolution was accomplished 
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through a fusion of old and new hegemonic groups. The old aristocracy re-
tained certain formal privileges, becoming the intellectual stratum of the 
new bourgeoisie. In this context, the new staff of the ruling bourgeoisie was 
also formed by elements of the old feudal classes who participated in the 
process of building new forms of economic power in the industrial and fi-
nancial world. Thus, what made the dialectic between progressive and tra-
ditional intellectuals possible? Gramsci suggests a line of research. At the 
economic-corporate level, the English bourgeoisie created a stratum of or-
ganic intellectuals who tried to exorcise their own weakness by incorporat-
ing the old landed aristocracy within State administration. 
The industrial development in Germany has some aspects that are similar to 
the English pattern. Here, too, the middle class emerged from an almost 
feudal social context by using the dynamics of fusion between old and new 
hegemonic groups achieved through a clear division of roles. The German 
bourgeoisie assumed the role of industrial and economic direction, leaving 
the role of intellectual and political direction to the old Junker aristocracy. 
Like in England, the bourgeoisie was not able to produce an organic intel-
lectual class that would be strong enough to assume a hegemonic role by 
itself. 
According to Gramsci, the French, English and German cases are three 
models of bourgeois revolution carried out in the strategic conflict between 
traditional and organic intellectuals. He contrasts these cases with the fail-
ure of the Italian bourgeoisie focusing mainly on the comparison between 
Jacobin France and the Italian Risorgimento. 
All the problems inherent in the connection of the different currents in the 
Italian Risorgimento may be ascribed, for Gramsci, to the fundamental fact 
that the moderates represented a relatively homogeneous social group, so 
their political leadership underwent limited fluctuations, while the Action 
Party didn’t support any historically determined social group, so that the 
oscillations of its ruling class were eventually shaped by the interests of the 
moderates. In fact the supremacy of a social group can manifest itself in 
two ways: either in the form of «domination», or in the form of «intellec-
tual and moral direction». A social group tends to “dominate” the opposing 
groups and seeks to wipe them out through military force, while it tends to 
“lead” similar or allied groups. A social group, however, must be able to 
exercise leadership even before winning governmental power. After gain-
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ing power, that group becomes dominant, but it must also be able to main-
tain its ruling position. 
The political history of the moderates during the Italian Risorgimento 
proves the truth of this assumption. They were the ruling class well before 
being the dominant class and this allowed them to rise to power by exerting 
hegemonic force with no need for excessive material force. In this sense, 
the Risorgimento in Italy was organized in the form of a «revolution with-
out revolution», that is a «passive revolution» (1977c, PN19, 87-88).  
The moderates were able to establish their hegemony by adopting “liberal” 
means, that is, through individual initiative at a molecular level, thus with-
out a party program developed according to a plan that precedes action and 
organizational practice. The field of the moderates was made up of intellec-
tuals who had already well developed their organicity to the social groups 
of which they were the expression. They were intellectuals, politicians and 
business managers  and, at the same time, big farmers, entrepreneurs and 
industrialists. Given these conditions, they exercised a great «spontaneous» 
power of attraction on the whole body of intellectuals of any rank. From  
this context, Gramsci claims, emerges the methodological consistency of a 
criterion for historical-political research: «There is no independent class of 
intellectuals but each social group has its own class of intellectuals or tends 
to form it; but the intellectuals of the progressive class, in the given condi-
tions, exercise such a power of attraction that ultimately they end up mak-
ing subaltern the intellectuals of other social groups, and then by creating a 
system of solidarity with all the intellectuals through psychological (vanity, 
etc.) and often caste-like ties (legal-technical, corporate, etc.)» (1977c 
PN19 88-89). 
This is accomplished in an almost spontaneous way when a social group 
assumes the features of a progressive class which enables the entire society 
to advance. When this social group ceases to fulfill its function, the entire 
ideological bloc that supports it tends to crumble, and spontaneity can be 
replaced by direct or indirect coercion, that is, through real police action or 
military coups. 
In the context of the Risorgimento, the Action Party, because of its articula-
tion was unable to exert such a power of attraction, therefore, it was itself 
subjected to attractions and influences, so much so that it was hesitant 
about accepting in its program some crucial popular demands, as such as 
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the agrarian reform. The Action Party, steeped as it was in the rhetoric tra-
dition typical of a certain Italian literature, tended to confuse the cultural 
unity existing in the peninsula – limited, however, to a very thin stratum of 
the population mainly polluted by Vatican cosmopolitanism - with the terri-
torial and political unity of the popular masses which were unconnected to 
that cultural tradition. For this reason, in Italy, the political action of the 
Actionists never reached the efficiency levels attained, for example, by the 
Jacobins in France. They fought in order to create a link between  cities and 
countryside, and their defeat at some point in the historical development 
was due to the fact that they clashed with the demands of the Parisian 
working class, yet their long rhetoric tradition would continue in the modal-
ity practiced by Napoleon and, in a certain sense, by Herriot’s and Daladi-
er’s radical-socialists. 
The different interpretations of the Jacobin experience are not right on tar-
get. The very term “Jacobinism” has come to assume two meanings: the 
first, historically characterized, is that of a political party which sees the 
development of French life in a specific way and is based on a particular 
program; a party which performs its action through an energetic and reso-
lute method derived from the occasionally fanatical belief in the soundness 
of that program (and that method). Hence the notion that a “Jacobin” is an 
energetic, determined and fanatical political man, confident in the miracul-
ous virtues of his ideas. In this view, the sectarian element prevails on the 
awareness of a movement that succeeded in giving voice to the major de-
mands of the popular masses connecting them with the element of national 
politics. 
Actually, the Action Party, according to Gramsci, in order to really assume 
the character of a progressive group, should have been “Jacobin”, not only 
in its external form of temperament, but also in its economic and social 
contents. In this way, the connection of the rural classes - which in Italy 
was realized by a reactionary bloc formed by clerical-legitimists intellectual 
classes - could also lead to the formation of a new liberal and national polit-
ical force. But in order to do so, the Actionists should have accepted the ba-
sic demands of peasants by appealing to them and to the intellectuals of the 
lower strata of society. 
The Jacobins conquered their function of ruling party through a strenuous 
fight. They imposed themselves on the French bourgeoisie leading them 
towards advanced positions. They exploited the situation by creating irre-
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versible facts, «by hunting out the middle-class kick in the pants». The 
“Third state” was in fact the less homogeneous. It was made up of a disin-
tegrated intellectual elite and an economically advanced but politically 
moderate social group. At first, its political action was limited to claims re-
garding corporate interests. Therefore, the forerunners of the Revolution 
were moderate reformers. In a relatively short time, however, a new elite 
came into existence that tended to see the bourgeoisie as a group exerting 
hegemony over all the popular forces. This was the result of a selection 
process that took place through the action of two factors: the resistance of 
traditional social forces and the international threat, two elements that 
without the vigorous and determined action of the Jacobins would have 
crushed the Third state. 
The Jacobins opposed any intermediate halt in the revolutionary process, 
by physically eliminating not only elements of the old society but also 
moderate revolutionaries, who had by this time become reactionary. There-
fore, on the one hand, the Jacobins represented the only revolutionary rul-
ing party to represent the aspirations of the immediate (and corporate) 
French bourgeois interests; on the other hand, they represented the revolu-
tionary movement as a complete historical development, since they encom-
passed also the future needs «of all national groups that had to be assimi-
lated to the existing fundamental group». 
They were without doubt as convinced of the validity of the rhetoric formu-
la «freedom, equality and fraternity» as popular masses were. «The lan-
guage of the Jacobins, their ideology, their methods of action perfectly re-
flected the needs of the time» even though today they might seem too “fre-
netic”. Their first need was to destroy enemy forces or reduce them to im-
potence in order to prevent the emergence of counter-revolutionary forces. 
Secondly, they posed the problem of enlarging middle class cadres by plac-
ing them at the head of the national forces, thus creating a political-military 
relationship favorable for the revolution, and by limiting liability in areas 
where enemy forces could recruit their own army. Rural France was 
brought to accept the hegemony of Paris, realizing that the old regime had 
to form a bloc with the most advanced forces of the Third state, marginaliz-
ing the Girondins who represented the soul of moderation. Even if at one 
point the Jacobins forced their hand too much, they did it in the very sense 
of historical development. They not only organized the bourgeoisie but 
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made them the dominant and, at the same time, the ruling class, able to ex-
press a thoroughly bourgeois state. 
The real problem of the Jacobins is that, until the end, they remained on a 
purely bourgeois ground, even when historical conditions were ripe for a 
further leap in quality. They refused to recognize the right of coalition to 
workers, continuing to enforce the Chapelier law. In this way, they broke 
the urban bloc of Paris and their assault forces were dispersed, bringing 
with them a feeling of disillusionment and disappointment. «In fact the 
Revolution had found the wider class limits. The politics of alliances and of 
the permanent revolution had ended by asking new questions that could not 
be resolved then, it had unleashed elemental forces that only a military dic-
tatorship would be able to contain» (1977c, PN19, 104-107). 
The reasons why a Jacobin party never emerged in Italy are to be found in 
the socio-economic fabric, that is, in the historical weakness of the bour-
geoisie in the Peninsula. The result was that the supporters of the Italian Ri-
sorgimento were never able to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses and, for 
that reason, they did not fulfill any of the planned objectives. They obtained 
just «the miserable political life since the 70s to 900, the elementary and 
endemic rebellion of the working classes, the crude and stunted existence 
of a skeptical and idle ruling class (ibid., 117). 
Tilly is very interested also in the dynamics of contention in France, as well 
as in the rest of Europe, between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and devotes to the topic countless publications through which he perfects 
his theory of collective action that is now so well known to scholars of po-
litical sociology and social movements that it does not need further discus-
sion (among the most illuminating texts, we should recall, Tilly 1964, 
1978; Shorter, Tilly 1974; C. Tilly, L. Tilly and R. Tilly 1975). We are in-
terested in the methodological approach that begins with Tilly’s criticism of 
the dominant sociological paradigms to claim the need for social theories 
rooted in time and space and monitored by a constant recourse to historical 
comparison. 
Having identified the eight postulates that tend to distort the sociological 
reading of historical and social processes, we must understand how they 
can be uprooted. On this point, Tilly proposes two approaches, a direct and 
an indirect approach. In the first case, it is necessary to “fight” the post-
ulates on their own ground by observing the same logic that led to the de-
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velopment of certain statements about the distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate violence, or about the differentiation process as a master 
frame of social change. We must then compare them with actual historical 
cases trying to identify alternative readings. In the second case, which is 
closely connected to the first, it is necessary to look for forms of generali-
zation that are rooted in historical processes. In this sense, we do not need 
to pursue universal statements, more or less confirmed by a variety of in-
stances occurring in different places and at different times; rather, we need 
to connect a set of specific cases and variables to different periods and con-
texts, linking together similar cases, being always aware of their space and 
time limits. It is at this point that historical comparison becomes crucial to 
describe and explain structural dynamics and large processes. 
The analysis of structures and processes is conducted, according to the sys-
tematization provided by Tilly, at four historical levels: 1) at a «world-
historical level», the researcher's task is to identify the specific properties of 
an era, contextualize and fix them in the flow of human history. At this lev-
el, for example, we can find the different patterns of social evolution, the 
rise and fall of empires, the development and entrenchment of specific pro-
duction patterns; 2) at a «world-systemic level», the researcher's task is to 
discern connections and changes in the most important part of a broad set 
of interrelated social structures; 3) at a «macro-historical level», the re-
searcher must give an account of structures and processes also mentioning 
their alternative forms in graphic form; and 4) at a «micro-historical level», 
the researcher's task is to trace the connections of individuals and groups 
with such structures and processes, in the hope of being able to explain 
their impact on social life (Tilly 1984, 60-61). 
Structures and processes are deemed relevant, therefore, depending on the 
level of analysis. At a world-historical level, the structures on which the at-
tention of the researcher is focused are those generally ascribable to the 
category of world-system, while the relevant processes are related to the 
transformation and the historical sequence of systems understood in their 
entirety. At this level, any discourse on the processes of urbanization, indu-
strialization and state-building would be inappropriate, as it would occur at 
a lower level than the wholeness of the world system. If a researcher choo-
ses to operate at this level, any comparison, if necessary, should be based 
on a comparison between world systems and, as Tilly states, «My eyes fal-
ter and my legs shake on this great plan» (ibid., 63). 
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At a historical systemic level, the dimension of world system continues to 
have its importance even if, in this case, the scholar  focuses on those 
world-system components that are based on networks of coercion and/or 
exchange. In the first case, the focus is mostly on the dimension of the na-
tion state understood as a more or less centralized, differentiated and auto-
nomous organization that has the capacity to control the means of coercion 
within a limited geographical area. In the second case, the researcher focus-
es on the patterns of production at a national or regional level, in particular, 
on the set of relationships between geographically segregated and interde-
pendent individuals and groups that have certain factors of production. In 
this case, the most important processes are those related to the dynamics of 
production, distribution and subordination. The comparison is here in-
tended to establish similarities and differences between networks of coer-
cion and exchange, as well as between processes of subordination, produc-
tion and distribution. At this level, Tilly points out, any attempt at generali-
zation is dangerous, controversial and difficult to verify. 
With the macro-historical level, according to Tilly, «we enter the ground of 
history as historians ordinarily treat it» (ibid.). Within a given world sys-
tem, we can certainly build states, modes of production, army associations, 
enterprises, networks, by gradually giving body to our unit of analysis. At 
this level, processes such as proletarianization, accumulation of capital, ur-
banization, state-building, bureaucratization are suitable for our analysis. In 
this case, the comparative measure is based on a comparison between these 
units, through which structural and procedural uniformity, variations and 
combinations can be identified. Their systematic study in specific macro-
systems fully falls within the logic of a historically rooted analysis that 
should be taken as the foundation of our cognitive activity. 
This should not lead us to underestimate the dimension of micro-history. 
When we analyze the impact of structures and processes on individuals and 
groups, we will necessarily draw a connection between personal experience 
and historical process. In this case, the frames of reference concern the rela-
tionships between individuals and social groups while processes are related 
to the transformation of the relations between individuals connected to 
those structural dynamics. If the researcher works at a micro level, any dis-
tinction between interactions and relationships will lose some of its mean-
ing. Comparisons between systems of relationship and their transformation 
take shape and consistency in the close link between those systems of rela-
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tionship and structural and procedural dimensions. In other words, the rela-
tionship between capitalists and workers makes sense only within the 
broader historical process of proletarianization and concentration of capital. 
Charles Tilly, among the four levels of analysis, prefers to dwell on the 
comparisons conducted at the macro-historical level and particularly on 
that borderland which is realized in the connection between macro- and mi-
cro-historical dimensions. 
Our objective is to identify a comparative approach able to account for the 
structures and processes that take place within a specific world system, so 
as to produce some limited – i.e., historically determined – generalizations. 
Since we aim to identify some regularity in such historical structures and 
processes, we do not need to analyze a large number of statistically treated 
instances. Comparative analysis of socio-historical processes and structures 
is most fruitful when we focus on a limited number of instances and «that is 
not because of the intrinsically greater value of small numbers, but because 
large numbers give an illusory sense of security» (Tilly 1984, 77). In the 
analysis of a small number of instances, the researcher has the opportunity 
to focus on the historical circumstances and the specific characteristics of 
each case, in order to identify some common features needed for compari-
son. 
Even if we abandon society as our unit of analysis, it does not mean that we 
must abandon also the dimension of nation state; what we need is an 
awareness that our points of reference are a territorial area and a population 
controlled by the state institutional system and not a thing apart, as stated in 
the first pernicious postulate. Of course, researchers have some alternatives, 
meaning that, instead of the State, they can select different units of analy-
sis, such as entire blocs of international powers, cities or city networks, re-
gional modes of production, social classes, and so on. What is important for 
researchers is to have a clear idea of the objects of their analysis, before 
they produce any theoretical proposition. 
Tilly distinguishes between different ways of comparing big structures and 
processes by classifying the different propositions one can potentially draw 
through comparative analysis. To do so, he combines two dimensions of 
comparison: one based on the «sharing of all instances» and one that is 
based on a «multiplicity of forms». The first dimension refers to those ac-
counts that emerge from a comparison ranging from the analysis of a single 
event – aimed at highlighting the specific features of the case itself – to the 
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analysis of more instances – intended to bring out the characteristics of all 
the cases considered. The second dimension refers to those accounts that 
emerge from a comparison ranging from single – when all cases of a phe-
nomenon have common properties – to multiple – when there are different 
forms of a phenomenon. By combining the two dimensions, four possible 
approaches to comparison emerge: «individualizing», «universalizing», 
«variation-finding», and «encompassing» comparisons. Individualizing 
comparisons are those that treat each case as essentially unique by mini-
mizing the significance of any property in common with other cases. Purely 
universalizing comparisons, in turn, are based on the identification of 
common properties in all cases. On the other hand, we have those types of 
comparisons that are based on the search for possible variations (variation-
finding) and, in particular, on the belief that we can establish a principle of 
change in the nature or intensity of a phenomenon starting from a system-
atic analysis of the differences between a number of instances. Encompass-
ing comparisons are instead based on the analysis of different instances in 
different places within the same macro-system. The purpose of this form of 
comparison is to explain the characteristics of each case in the light of an 
evolving relationship with the system as a whole. 
 
5. Contentious politics and democratic process 
At the end of our comparative study, we can suggest some reflections on 
the thoughts of our two authors. Within the scope of this work, we have to 
leave out the specific studies conducted by Gramsci and Tilly, to concen-
trate our attention on their approaches and in particular on those aspects 
where we can find significant evidence of connection. We have seen that 
both authors assume an analogous  starting point in their criticism of 
mechanistic and evolutionistic sociology in order to support the need for an 
analysis of social phenomena understood in their specific historicity. Both 
authors regard contentious politics as the central dimension in the process 
of historical development and, therefore, as a vital element of sociological 
interest. 
Tilly’s intellectual agenda is absolutely historical. His main objective is to 
understand how collective action evolved in Europe under the influence of 
major structural changes such as the processes of industrialization, urbani-
zation and, in particular, the two macro-processes represented by the devel-
